Masks: Words that Hide Agendas

edited 4/3/20

Vote for me and if the legislature doesn’t pass budgets on time, they won’t get paid. -- Political candidate in Pennsylvania, Fall 2012

Despite years and years of nationalistic indoctrination, Americans tend to coagulate into a loose confederacy of “tribes.” Consequently we tend to be “agreement junkies,” especially when we are in the company of people we believe to be of “our own kind.” It’s just not nice to be contrary, or even, to show lack of enthusiasm.

In such a culture, simple slogans, like toadstools, spring up to mask substantial false consensus as to our individual positions -- e.g. whom are willing to vote for, what we value, whom we disagree with. Experienced politicians recognize this lack of depth in our professions of allegiance and thus steer away from explicit and specific discussions of their proposals for change.

Technical knowledge is not very widespread among the voting populace. Nonetheless, scientific sounding words, such as, entitlement, efficiency, cost, benefit, rent, profit, and the like are frequently invoked in political rhetoric.

But even more common-sounding words like harm, threat, risk, safety, protection, are sufficiently vague to mislead voters to imagine that they will be getting benefits which the future office-holders, in fact, can escape delivering through clever reinterpretation of their “promises.” (For example, does the would-be Pennsylvania legislator cited in the epigraph really think he will be able to control paycheck distribution for legislative members?)

The dynamics of consensus confusion revolve around issues of value, priority and probability. In a controversy, these issues are finessed by unexamined concessions about what is valuable or cheap (value), what is important or expendable (priority), and what is imminent or remote (probability).

For example, efficiency is generally seen to depend upon minimizing costs in pursuit of a goal. But if the goal is not accepted universally to be of value, or of the same priority in competition with other possible goals, estimations of efficiency will vary substantially. Universal college education is such a goal.

Consider risk as another example. Unless a situation is universally viewed as both threatening and imminent, many will discount what others consider disaster. Global warming seems to be such a situation.

During times of political interest, we find vague or confused references to “liberals” or “conservatives,” “moderates” or “extremists,” emphasized by media “spokespersons” much more intent on attracting attention -- ya gotta sell advertising -- than communicating accurate information. (See Believer vs Atheist, Conservative vs Liberal, and other distracting frauds.)

The assumptions people make, seldom stated publicly, support their own agendas -- not necessarily ours. And any but the simplest word is open to misunderstanding if we are mistaken about the assumptions its users are making. (See, for example, items specified in a Controversy Analysis Worksheet.)


Also, important in everyday life are certain assumptions that even more deeply underlie concerns for conflicts of individual vs individual, or, even, group vs group. These are certain “social assumptions,” principles so profoundly embedded in our culture that in many situations we overlook them entirely; although, upon consideration, we would find them far from indubitable.

These principles are

The Principle of Command: To command is to control, i.e. presidents can control national employment and foreign events;

The Principle of Accepted Value: What we value, everyone (should) value, i.e. no sensible, sane person could disagree with us; and

The Principle of Objectivity: Facts are facts, and, e.g., they are determinable without error by human agencies.

How do such principles come to control our thought processes? The quick answer is:

a. we rely on such Social Assumptions to support not only our personal agendas, but our conceptions of Knowledge, of Authority and of Obligation;

b. consequently they support practices we take to be important, essential to our personal, social, corporate, political, and moral life.

Unfortunately, quickness does not guarantee accuracy.

For references and to examine these issues further, see Questionable Assumptions in Social Decision Making


Cordially
--- EGR

An Ancient "Ghost", Yet to be "Exorcised": Precision

Indicate precisely what you mean to say,
Yours sincerely wasting away.
-- Paul McCartney, "When I'm Sixty-Four"

A Comparison? An interesting picture is given by McCartney's lyric: there is

a. something that a person means to say; and, also, a second thing that is
b. an indicator of that something meant.

What is being asked for is precision of the indicator to the meaning. But how would we judge that?

If I ask you to tell me precisely how long your left foot is, you grab a rule and hold it alongside your left foot and make a comparison with your heel at the beginning of the number scale and the measurement mark most in line with the end of your toe. We know how to go about that.

But what kind of comparison can we make between what you mean to say and something offered as an indicator of it?

This is a problem very similar to what we encounter if we believe that when we read aloud a text, we are describing the thoughts of its author. What can we compare? Can we independently get at the author's thoughts to see if the words he chose are "fitting" to them? (See "An Ancient View of Authorship".)

Impossible Correspondences? This is actually an old chestnut in a different guise: the correspondence theory of knowledge. If we imagine that "knowing" indicates a correspondence between your thoughts and "objects in the real world" we face the problem how we can determine that that correspondence exists. And why would we ever want to "correct" ourselves?

But, actually, we have a very similar problem with our foot and the ruler. Some rulers are scored in full inches; others, in fractions of the inch. We are trained to think that using a finer scale gives us more precision. Sometimes it does. But consider this: what happens if the length of something varies depending on the fineness of the scale we use to measure it?

Things like that don't happen, you say? Wrong. Measure any natural coastline. Begin by indicating its length in miles but stepping a mile long ruler (do this on a map) from one end point to the next. If you use a 1/2-mile long scale the coastline measurement will INCREASE! Why? Because you will catch more variations in the coastline at a half-mile than at a mile.

Increase the fineness of the measurement scale and the length of the coast will increase even more as every little brook and stream and inlet gets marked by that scale. Theoretically, it would seem that every coastline expands to infinity as our scales become finer and finer -- except for the fact that as we approach molecular levels there would be variation, if not confusion, as to what would be the length of the coastline.

(You can check this out on Wikipedia at "How Long Is the Coast of Britain? Statistical Self-Similarity and Fractional Dimension")

Is This Proof of No Meaning, No Knowledge, No Length? Not at all. But it does show that the ideas of precision that were drummed into us as part of our basic education deserve a more critical review than we might think.

If you've ever wondered what the criticism meant when you were told that your speech, or your writing or your ideas were "imprecise," you were not exhibiting stupidity. What precision is, exactly, as regards speech, writing or thought, is seldom explained: either from lack of knowledge on the part of the critic; or, from the critic's desire to maintain a position of dominance over you -- no doubt for reasons of "moral discipline."

In much schooling, quantification is appealed to precisely because it seems to enhance "precision" in discussion and investigation. However, Deborah Stone offers some telling criticisms about this practice especially as it is used to support the domination of some people by others. See for example, "Using Quantitative Procedures Wisely".

Cordially,

--- EGR

Common Sense, or Merely Common Hubris?

edited120918

“Nothing is more fairly distributed than common sense: no one thinks he needs more of it than he already has.” ― René Descartes, Discourse on Method

Hume was on to something. John Locke had proposed that our senses responded to our experience by presenting sensations to the mind. The mind in turn worked to store these sensations as memories or to connect and then store these sensations as complex memories.

David Hume saw Locke’s theory as disabling the distinction between what we nowadays call “correlation” and “causation.” Our sensations are of events in our experience. All we can observe through our senses, even our senses amplified by instruments, are events. But we are in the habit of believing in cause and effect if one kind of event is consistently followed by events of another, different kind.

Indeed this tendency to connect one predecessor class of events to another following class gives rise to the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, “after that, therefore because of that.” For example, people more often feel queasy after eating raw clams, than after eating zucchini; so, they think, "Raw clams cause queasiness more so than does zucchini.” (But what if people who eat raw clams stuff themselves more frequently than those who eat zucchini?}

Between correlated event-classes we do not observe an intermediate event, a causal nexus, as it is sometimes called, that helps us distinguish between causation and “mere” correlation. True. But there is another way to look at this.

Maintaining Cause and Effect. Immanuel Kant attempted a rescue by proposing that Locke had gotten it wrong. The Mind (in German, Verstand, translated both as “mind” and as “understanding,” -- not Seele, Gemüt, or Sinn also translatable as “mind”) does not merely make connections of sensation brought in through the senses. The Mind’s very structure tends to process correlative event classes as cause and effect. We can hardly help but understand -- at least initially -- repeated correlation as indicating cause. This theory has been found to be much more attractive in the US since the withering of radical Behaviorism in the later 20th Century. (See A Critical Review of B.F. Skinner's Philosophy )

However, invoking some logic, there is a more direct way of thinking about it. We can accept Hume, yet maintain the distinction between correlation and causation. Consider universal negatives, which are statements that propose that, at any place or at any time, something is not; or, that nothing is, a certain way or thing.

For example, “There are no such thing as dragons,” or, what is logically equivalent, “There are no dragons, anywhere, ever.” The issue here is not whether the claim of the non-existence of dragons is true or false; but, whether there is an observation we -- or beings like us, of limited breadth of experience in space and time -- can perform to establish it.

Note that it is easier to disprove a negative universal than to establish it. The find of one dragon disproves it. But despite a very, very large number of failures to find a dragon, any claim that they don’t exist is not proven by that failure. It was, in fact, widely believed in the 19th Century and earlier that there was no such thing as a black swan. There are, in Australia. Also, tomatoes were considered to be poisonous, e.g. there was no such thing as a tomato that could safely eaten by humans. We know differently.

Disproving "No Swans are Not White."

Reconsider the example given above about the relation of eating raw claims and queasiness. The very argument against its being causation demonstrates that we bring much more to such a causal claim than a narrow consideration of correlation: we consider possible alternatives, or intermediaries, standardly characterized as confounding or mediating variables. A host of assumptions and presuppositions supports our observational reports.(See Identifying Trans-ideological Epistemological Presuppositions)

The “Common Sense” of American (School) Reform. There is always the possibility of hidden, overlooked or disregarded causes or effects that undermine an assertion that one situation causes another. As many have discovered, an apparent “common-sense” causal relation can disappear under closer scrutiny due to confounding or mediating variables.

There are a host of causal myths involved with all sorts of reform efforts, in particular, American education, primary, secondary, and higher, be it public, private or parochial. For example:

Bad or insensitive teachers are the primary cause of failing students.

Students have learning styles. Teachers can teach to them, i.e. no child is unteachable.

College is a pure waste of time, i.e. nothing worth the cost is learned.

Today’s schools are in a position to forestall 21st Century employment problems.

(See References to Schooling Myths.)

Such “common sense” beliefs underlie the hubris that drives a great many of today’s school reform undertakings. Their prospect is to continue on in a century-long American tradition: the cavalier waste of mis-aimed scarce resources leading to reform failure.

To examine these and related issues at greater length, see Moral Responsibility in the Education Industry: 
how much can school reform enhance a student's occupational fitness?)


Cordially
--- EGR

Critical Thinking About “Critical Thinking”?

There are more than 16,000 school districts in the United States and nearly all of them say they teach critical thinking. Google “critical thinking” and “mission statement” and you will find page after page of heart-warming affirmations like this one from the Lordstown, Ohio School District: “We believe in the development of critical thinking skills.”

Commendable; but what would happen if critical thinking actually were effectively taught? Suppose the youngsters in Lordstown learned to truly, seriously and boldly scrutinize the nation’s customs, principles, and beliefs. Suppose they even learned to critically examine the authorities that most of us defer to in directing our lives and defining the good, the true, the beautiful? No doubt that they would be thinking critically. But would educators who facilitate this sort of inquiry receive hearty congratulations or have to flee a mob of angry, torch-wielding villagers?

Let’s be clear, by “critical thinking” we do not mean mere logic chopping. You know, the “these are the premises” and “this is a conclusion,” sort of thing that sometimes passes for critical thinking. That sort of thing is harmless because it rarely results in serious challenges to anything deeply believed.

No, by critical thinking we mean systematically reconsidering the deep assumptions that most of us take for granted. And we also include questioning authority — including sacred and semi-sacred source documents as well as those who interpret them. Thinking critically has to include this sort of thing or it is hardly critical.

To get kids thinking, for instance, educators could familiarize them with the well-known argument from evil. It maintains that a loving God would permit only as much physical suffering as is absolutely necessary to achieve the greater good. Yet the world is stuffed full of seemingly unnecessary misery. What, we could ask students, is one to make of this?

Is that one too religious for public school? Then how about a high school assignment such as this? “We are often told that the United States is the greatest nation on earth. Working together, decide what standards you think should be used to measure a nation’s greatness; then use those standards to compare the United States with other nations.

Some might argue that it isn't necessary to tackle such issues head on; that by teaching generic critical thinking methods learners will eventually bring these tools to bear on those deep assumptions and basic authorities that are central to their lives. But such transfer of learning cannot be relied upon. If we want young people to really think critically, we must provide them with direct and well-focused opportunities to do so. Just be prepared to find another job shortly thereafter.

T0 examine these issues further, see Additional Reflections on Critical Thinking)


Sincerely,

Gary K. Clabaugh, Ed. D.

Getting Clear on Outcomes : a preliminary to project planning

There are many examples ... of situations in which disparate groups of politicians and the constituents they represent have joined together in common cause but consensus has represented nothing more than a superficial commitment to a simple slogan. -- Susskind & Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse, 1987, p.63-64

Suppose we were considering funding a project to improve student scores in mathematics. Suppose it is shown that Johnny Jones has failed a math test. Is Mr. Smith his teacher to blame because he is a bad teacher? Or is Johnny a lackadaisical student? Or was Johnny sick when he took the test? Or something else?

From the meager information that Johnny failed a test, we cannot make a fair judgment. Johnny’s failure might be accounted for by any of the suggested explanations. How could we add information to the skeletal description, "Johnny Jones failed a math test," to make a decision as to what really happened? What information would be critical? What would be non-informative? What our project aims at will depend upon it.

People often jump into planning a project without carefully specifying what outcomes they are looking for. This avoidance is done sometimes because they feel that the commitment to the project is weak and they don’t want to provoke objections. A risky choice! They may finesse agreement in the initial stages of the project only to have crucial support pulled out after vast expenditures of resources. Such has happened, for example, throughout the history of school reform movements in the United States.

Another reason they may avoid careful specification of outcomes is that they think such procedures are a “mere matter of semantics,” a dispensible impediment to “action-oriented” people like themselves to getting things accomplished. This is delusion. It treats superficial consent to vague terms as though it were deep commitment.

If you consider how many things incite calls to action which are later abandoned because hidden disagreements arise to sap them of support, you will likely agree that some kind of process is in order that will help avoid misunderstandings at a basic level. The alternative is to go ahead blindly and hope for the best. From experience we know that the likely result is a vast waste of time, money and effort.

The process we suggest is called case comparison and analysis. In using it we bring up realistic examples for consideration. We note differences and similarities. We decide which cases we, individually, can agree on most clearly represent the critical terms contained in our goal statement. Then we try to spell out what the defining characteristics are for those terms.

Examples of cases for analysis can be found via the following links:

Model Cases: Effective, Moral or Worthy Teaching
Model Cases: Justice, Expedience, Favoritism
Model Cases: Punishment, Cruelty, Infliction

Take a look at the cases involved. You will see that they are very similar. Yet a minor difference in description may involve a major change in how we classify them.

For references and to examine these issues further, see Defeating or Supporting a Case Characterization


Cordially
--- EGR

Knowledge, Freedom, Wisdom: Are These the Point of Schooling?

edited 3/21/20

Who are a little wise, the best fools be. – John Donne

It is not accidental that we speak of sending our dogs to “obedience school.” Show horses, too, are schooled. Indeed, any circus animal that that is to perform in public receives “schooling.”

Such training is necessary since the natural impulses of dogs, horses, elephants and tigers are not attuned to cooperating with or supporting human social purposes believed to be desirable. So must it be thought to be the same with human children, to judge from our practices of compulsory schooling.

“But unless they go to school, kids would run wild and grow up to be, at best, anti-social ruffians.” Perhaps. But does this mean that incarcerating them for ever-increasing periods of time -- think of the movements to do away with recess, summer vacations and free Saturdays--, will make them (and us) healthy, wealthy and wise?

So what if they do learn a little math; and less writing? And even less history? Whose benefit is served if they learn to spout scientistic slogans about human nature and the universe? For example, “All human behavior is generated from the brain according to the laws of nature.” Or, “According to the latest research the universe is finite (or infinite, or multiple -- pick one or more).” How is it possible to take seriously supposedly “scientific” pronouncements about “all” of anything from individuals who inhabit a mere speck of dust in a remote corner of the (or “a”) universe during a minuscule interval of time?

The previous statement is not an attempt to beat up scientists: just the popularizers and propagandizers of “science” whose overextended conjectures end up in the schoolbooks students are exposed to (usually in textbook chapter summaries, or supporting materials). (See The Curse of Knowledge vs The Dunning--Kruger Effect: an instructor's dilemma.)

For good reason, public educators in our pluralistic society attempt to distinguish between religion and science in constructing curriculum. What they often miss, however, is that being skeptical, or anti-religious, does not, in and of itself, qualify an idea as being scientific.

To examine these issues further, see Questionable Assumptions in Social Decision Making


Cordially
--- EGR