Showing posts with label argument. Show all posts
Showing posts with label argument. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Learning Common Sense: tricks and false consensus?

updated 061418

AI still lacks what most 10-year-olds possess: ordinary common sense. -- Paul Allen, quoted in C Gohd "It’s Really Hard to Give AI “Common Sense” [1]

...once (AI) becomes very large, and it has thousands of units per layer and maybe hundreds of layers, then it becomes quite un-understandable. - T Jaakkola, MIT [2]

AI is useless until it learns how to explain itself. -- L James Towards Data Science[2]

"It is by universal misunderstanding that all agree." -- Baudelaire [3]

"Playing" with Deception. Many of the games adults play with even very young children work at getting them to recognize that sometimes what they see, hear, feel or remember can be misleading. Even one-year olds can be introduced to "peek-a-boo" in which they learn that the immediate disappearance brought about by covering one's eyes does not, by itself, make what they have just seen, go away.


Two-year olds can be surprised and entertained with a game called, "I caught your nose," where the adult or older, less naive child, uses curled forefinger and middle finger of one hand to gently clasp the younger's nose, moves the hand away while sliding the thumb in between the two fingers and says "I caught your nose."

I have seen such games played hundreds of times. The naive child's initial reaction is usually one of surprise -- although sometimes one of dismay or even shock -- but, as the "nose-holding" hand opens up empty and the adult says, "feel you face" the child, relieved, will smile or even laugh and invite: "Do it again."

But playing with deception most likely only works under two (among many possible other) conditions. These are that
1. the children are more or less "normal," i.e. healthy, awake, and undistracted by such things as a wet diaper or hunger and

2. the experiences of the learners bring them to develop a sense of probability concerning what they perceive in contrast to other options that might occur.
If, for example, a person playing peek-a-boo hides or, say, dons a mask, while the child is covering its eyes, the experience will likely not teach much about what is likely to happen under which circumstances. Nor will it happen if the child is developmentally too under- or overdeveloped to benefit from the interaction.[4]

Deception games in educational contexts are usually a kind of training in "normality," e.g. merely covering the eyes does not change what's "really there." Or, if something's where it should be, say, you nose on your face, then it can't also be somewhere else. This is training in what we call "common sense."

However, a sense of "normality" is different from "common sense." As children grow, they might get training in a more sophisticated, less "common," form of "common sense." For older children we might use a poem such as
As I was going to St. Ives,
I met a man with seven wives.
Every wife had seven sacks.
Every sack had seven cats.
Every cat had seven kits.
Kits, cats, sacks and wives,
How many were going to St. Ives?
One or more students hurry to do the arithmetic and come up with 2401. We "correct" them by saying that the answer is "one", because I, alone, was going to St. Ives. The teaching point is usually to get them to read more carefully.

But a more insightful student might point out that the poem does not originally indicate, "I alone was going to St. Ives." It's possible, therefore, had I already had (unmentioned) co-travelers, that at least 2402 were going to St. Ives. The original teaching point -- Read Carefully! -- fails, but is (hopefully) compensated for by the discussion of the possible assumptions and what they let us infer.

Even relatively sophisticated adults can be fooled by clever illusionists who appear to make coins disappear and, then, pull them from a spectator's ear. Trained scientists have been known to insist that they have seen individuals bend spoons without touching them. Illusionist's confederates are "seen" to get cut in half and survive the sawblade's mutilation. And elephants can disappear in a puff of smoke!

In such circumstance, however, the victims of the illusion either
1. are not able to carefully examine the surroundings of the events, for e.g. being seated in an audience; or,

2. are generally ignorant of techniques of illusion, e.g. coin-palming, or attention-distraction,
which, though employed in their present circumstances, are rare in day-to-day experience.

Of greater concern to us, perhaps, should be the abundant presence of illusionists of political and commercial enterprise armed with well-established research on psychological biases and manipulation techniques. Educational institutions have yet to catch up with, much less keep abreast of, these clever people.

Both schooling and experience, in general, work toward refining "common sense" even to the point of supplanting it with something else. But a socially important, very problematic conception of these processes is the common myth that some substantial residues of the original "common sense" remain as a substrate, so to speak, of newer learnings. The myth holds it that the residues remain not merely as individual inclinations and skills, but as widely shared, if only latent, tools all can rely on.[5]

Consider the following conversation between an employer (E) and a prospective job-holder (P):
E: P, I've brought you in, P, to ask you to run our Department of X.

P: But E, as a Y manager, I haven't had any experience really working with X!"

E: Yeah; but, you've been successful with Y. And your heart's in the right place. I feel we'll get along just fine. So when it comes to working with X, just rely on your common sense!"[6]


Whether or not we find such a conversation problematic might well depend on the kind of organization E and P will be involved in. If it is, say, a small but expanding family-owned-and-run retail operation, that is one thing. However, if it is a middle-sized medical-surgical establishment, or a large kitchen-facilities factory, other concerns arise.

As Joan Woodward [8] has long argued, there are important and complex relations between organizational structure, staff social relations, and productivity.[9]

What is Common? What Makes Sense? A typical definition of common sense from The Cambridge English Dictionary gives us:[10]
The basic level of practical knowledge and judgment that we all need to help us live in a reasonable and safe way.
Examples: Windsurfing is perfectly safe as long as you have/use some common sense.

Note how many terms presume anterior "definition": basic level, practical, knowledge, judgment, reasonable, perfectly, safe. But what level is "basic?" What kind of information is "knowledge?" Who does "we all?" refer to? What is "reasonable;" what is "safe?"

Our natural languages use terms that are often vague and ambiguous, highly dependent on situation. Many of our linguistic choices are based on our belief that others can understand and trust us even though we vacillate in choice of words -- not meaning "literally" what we say -- to color our speech with our own values, moods and intentions.[11] We make them functionally precise ("clear" enough) by adjusting them, ad hoc, to the contexts we use them in and in relying (perhaps, wrongly) on our assumptions of normality.

Consider the following example of an all-too typical conversation,
Harry: Snow again! It's May! I've lived here all my life and never before seen so much snow!
Jack: Uh-huh. It shows how global warming is just a fraud!"
Harry: What makes you think so?"
Jack: It's obvious to anyone who has any common sense." More snow, less warmth!

A critical claim here is "More snow, less warmth!" This is common sense to millions of people, in the U.S. at least. We may say they are mistaken, but the falsity of their premise does not necessarily affect the logic of their argument. The argument may be based on a "confusion" between the notions of "climate," a characterization of weather events over extended periods of time and with large areas of occurrence; and, "weather," states of the atmosphere, e.g. phenomena of temperature change, precipitation, etc. considered from restricted perspectives which are more likely to be experienced by individuals or smaller populations. Breadth of perspective is independent, one would think, of commonality.

When was the last time a poll was taken to ascertain which individuals living under which conditions share common agreement on the assumptions underlying the definitions of the Cambridge English Dictionary? [12]

Depending upon where they are located and how informed they are, they may well be exercising their "common sense" even though it brings them to false conclusions. Recall only how phlogiston once provided a scientifically acceptable theory of combustion. Recall, also, that despite the efforts of Lister and Pasteur, many educated people rejected bacterial action as a cause of infection.

Every linguistic transaction is a wager which may not gain "high predictive probability" by being written down in "black and white" or entered as code into a computer program. Just as arguments can be valid without being sound, so can valid arguments yield falsehoods though they rest on common sense.

To continue with similar considerations, go to The Indeterminacy of Consensus: masking ambiguity and vagueness in decision.

-- Cordially, EGR


Footnotes and References

[1] quoted in Chelsea Gohd (Futurism, 3/11/ 2018) It’s Really Hard to Give AI “Common Sense

[2] Knight, W (MIT Technology Review, 4/11/18) The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI
See also James, L Towards Data Science (2018) AI is useless until it learns how to explain itself.

[3] Baudelaire, C Intimate Journals XCIX
See also G Clabaugh & E Rozycki (1999) The Nature of Consensus

[4]"Developmentally appropriate" is one of those educational concepts that is both theoretically dense and vague as well as hard to specify a non-circular definition for. See Redden & Frederick below.[7]

[5] See Rozycki, E (2014) Common Sense, or Merely Common Hubris?

[6] See Rozycki, E (2017) Hard Practical Questions? Handle Them or Dodge Them! Here's How

[7] Redden, JP & Frederick, S (2011) Unpacking Unpacking: Greater Detail Can Reduce Perceived Likelihood Journal Of Experimental Psychology

[8] Joan Woodward, Industrial Organization. Theory and Practice. Reprint. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966)

[9] See, also Productivity, Politics and Hypocrisy in American Public Education.

[10]The Cambridge English Dictionary on 'common sense'

[11] See Rozycki, E (2016) Three Human Dimensions of Conceptualization

[12] See Rozycki, E (2016) All Definition Ultimately Rests on Stipulation, i.e. Communal Agreement.

Monday, May 30, 2016

"Therefore … !" Proof or Spoof?

Sir, (a+bn)/n = x, therefore God exists. Please respond! -- Euler to Diderot, 1773.
An Unlikely Story. In 1773 atheist philosopher Denis Diderot visited the Imperial Court at St. Petersburg to personally thank Empress Catherine for the patronage which was to spare him an impoverished old age. So that his often disconcerting though entertaining atheistic polemics not remain unremonished by his Christian hosts, it was arranged that he be present at a "mathematical" demonstration of the existence of God.

The mathematician Leonhard Euler was to make the initial statement in what was hoped would be another entertaining debate. Euler, addressing himself to Diderot, declared with a tone of perfect conviction, “Monsieur, (a+bn)/n = x, donc Dieu existe; respondez!" Diderot, totally ignorant of mathematics (according to Dieudonné Thiébault as related to DeMorgan), was dumbfounded. Diderot was granted permission to return immediately to France.

Although this anecdote has become something of a legend, it ignores the fact that Diderot, himself, was quite a good mathematician. He would have easily recognized Euler’s assertion to be a non sequitur. The point here, of course, is not whether God exists or not. Rather it is whether reciting a mathematical formula proves God’s existence when it is connected with the word “therefore.” Does any statement, call it A, prove another statement, B, when we all we do is connect them with the word, “therefore”? For example, “Dogs are mammals; therefore, the moon is not made of green cheese?”

We would hardly deny that dogs being mammals has no connection to what the moon is made of. The Euler-Diderot story illustrates, however, what is to this day a common use of the word “therefore” -- or any of its many synonyms --: to foist off a nonsequitur on an unattentive or naïve audience.

The Many Synonyms of Therefore. Therefore connects a statement or body of statements (sometimes called “premises”) to a concluding statement, generally known as a “conclusion.” In contexts in which the word, therefore, would sound too high-falutin’, there are many other variations available: for example,
so
hence
in conclusion we must recognize that
consequently
it follows that
proves that
the weight of the evidence indicates that
But the most important thing for us to realize -- that which makes them most dangerous -- is that using any of these words or phrases to support possible conclusions rules out what may be real live options. Therefore and its family members insinuate that other possible considerations are not supported by the option already singled out by the therefores. (See An Introduction to Models of Reasoning)

Obscuring or Discarding Live Options. This is far more than a “mere” theoretical lesson. When, for example, we face a problem for which we are considering alternative solutions for decision, we must be on guard that the therefores of different partisan interests be more than attempts to intimidate or seduce us into acceptance of their special concerns. Intimidation and seduction need seldom be employed if everyone -- or a majority, at least -- can be convinced that the selected decision is adequately and reasonably supported.


To continue this train of thought see Rationales for Intervention: From Test to Treatment to Policy: A forensic theory of warrants & rebuttals


Cordially
--- EGR

Sunday, April 10, 2016

Concept as Abstraction. A hindrance in developing intelligence?

EDITED 191720*
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description ["hard-core pornography"], and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. -- United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, 378 U.S. at 197 (1964)

Why Do We Need Lawyers, Judges, Interpreters ...? Because we often need to reach a workable consensus on what a text-- or statement -- means before taking action. Deliberation and authoritative decision may be needed. Texts, or language in general, can often be vague and ambiguous; and, perceptions can be surprisingly idiosyncratic. (See What Little Babies See That You No Longer Can.. And not only just babies! -- EGR)

Documents alone do not yield definitiveness. Conceptual agreement is the end of many an investigation (consider dissertation advising); agreement is seldom an absolute beginning. (See The Indeterminacy of Consensus )

A Misleading Tradition. Since we all can recognize examples of virtue, Socrates asks Meno to say what virtue, in general, is. Meno replies by giving Socrates examples of virtue. Socrates objects: no, no. What Socrates wants is the common thread (the abstraction), running through all the examples which makes them examples of virtue. Meno fails the test. So Socrates presses to the conclusion that Meno doesn't know what virtue is. Nor, Socrates would readily admit, does he himself. (But see Sakezles, P. Socratic Skepticism” )


The rhetorical stratagem here is to set up Meno for Socrates' doctrine of the Forms, otherworldly existants that are what knowledge comprises and that we encounter only spiritually. Learning, for Socrates, is explained as our recalling, re-recognizing, Forms previously encountered before birth, say, or in a previous life.

In fact, Meno has rendered a perfectly good definition of virtue; but, in a form that Socrates does not (want to?) recognize because it specifies no common thread.

If we allow that definitions delineate concepts, enabling us to sort out what belongs to a class from what does not, then besides the genera-species definition form (the abstraction) that Socrates is plumping for, a recursive definition works as well.

A Non-abstractive Approach. I used to teach the calculus in a private high school where I was headmaster and would occasionally play a game called "WFF&Proof" with my students. They had to roll a set of six dice that had sides marked with the following: p, q, r, C, A, K, E or N. After a throw they had to see if they could construct a WFF, a well-formed-formula, by arranging the outcomes in various combinations.

A WFF was defined as any of the following: p, q or r. (Addendum 1, 2/7/16: Note that there is no indication of p, q, or having common features.)

Also WFF's were combinations of the letters C, A, K or E followed by two WFF's. Or N followed by a single WFF. So beginning with p, q, or r, one could possibly construct the new WFF's, Np or Nq or Nr. Continuing in this vein, one might construct Apq, or ANpp, or CAqKqrr, ... (Addendum 2, 2/7/16: Note also that no two complex WFF's need have common features, e.g. Cpr and ErArr.)

* We can use Meno's example and define operator V = "is virtuous" to mean merely "has some virtue". And since we are trying to avoid abstraction, i.e. talk about classes, "has some virtue" does not mean "is a member of the class of exemplars of virtue." So now "Virtue" can be defined as "anything that has some virtue." (We thus avoid a question as to whether we have "all" such things under consideration.

Now, if we have to sort out, say, bravery from cowardice, since Bravery is a (Meno-)WFF and Cowardice is not, the concept advanced by Meno does the work of sorting them out. The basic idea here is that if you can, initially, practically sort out contending examples, even of they lack common characteristics, then the label you put on the covering set needn't really matter, depending upon your purposes. (See Does your school really need a kluge-maker"

Another Approach. But isn’t “is virtuous” just as abstract a concept as “Virtue.” It’s difficult to say, but it involves very different procedures for reaching consensus. Trying to agree on what virtue is, in toto, bumps up against philosophical, religious and cultural commitments a lot sooner than merely asking a group to name and evaluate examples, e.g. something I have done for years with graduate students:
Let’s propose a number of situations or actions and then rate each one on a scale from one to five, say,
1 = definitely not virtuous;
2 = probably not virtuous;
3 = not clearly virtuous or not;
4 = probably virtuous;
5= definitely virtuous.
Then we’ll restrict our attention to 4 and 5 and then see what common threads, if any, they contain.”
(For applications, see A Library of MODEL CASES FOR ANALYSIS)

Of course we will have to examine and justify any proposal X to be a VX, focussing on the particulars of that X rather than doing it top-down from a "higher" abstractional level, straining at heavy philosophical lifting and the likely dissension it occasions.

This is exactly what Ethics Committees in various institutions often have to do in order to achieve even a general agreement. Where concrete problems have to be dealt with, abstract theoretical discussion tends to generate dissensus; practical specificity, more likely, consensus. As in a courtroom, we try first to ascertain not, whether a given law is just, but whether a violation has occurred. (See A. R.Jonsen, & S. Toulmin. The abuse of casuistry: a history of moral reasoning. 1988. Berkeley: U of Cal. Press. Especially pages 16 through 20.)

Abstraction as Sieve. It would probably be unwise to use a coffee filter on a sewage pipe to get potable drinking water. A lot of unwanted things, even excepting most coffee grounds, could likely have passed through, e.g. harmful bacteria and dissolved heavy metals. What the sieve has captured may not give any indication as to what has escaped.

Our organs of perception and internal nervous processors also work as sieves – but inversely from a coffee filter: here we want the “grounds.” We cannot, as dogs can, process the information in light energy that is not within the human visual spectrum. Ditto for the aural spectrum. Nor can we sieve out information from X-rays with any parts of our natural bodies. We need to extend our perceptual apparatus with instrumentation to make up the lack.

If you are listening to a person speak in a language you don’t know, you often can’t even tell which utterances are information-laden and which are random sound. What is even more interesting is that, for languages you do speak well, you can often not keep from overhearing what an individual person in a crowd is saying, even if her voice is somewhat drowned out.

The development of our “sieves” are very much dependent on help from our caregivers to help us strain out what our social environment traditionally recognizes as information-laden or random. The discovery that self-learning neural nets perceive the world in “weird” ways should hardly come as a surprise. Even feral humans, artists, and others who regularly experience synaesthesia or pareidolia are similarly "weird."

For examples and to pursue these issues, see Abstraction.

Cordially -- EGR

Wednesday, November 23, 2011

Critical Thinking: weapon, or tool for self-development?

updated 8/5/20
"He who asks a question is a fool for five minutes; he who does not ask a question remains a fool forever." - Chinese Proverb
One of the most persistent suggestions for curing what ails American education at all levels is to help students develop "critical thinking." Everywhere, you find people complaining that college graduates don't know how to think critically. Neither do younger students.

But why is critical thinking often praised but seldom implemented in the schools? There are four important reasons. This first is that, in casual conversation, “critical” implies nasty, often disrespectful, mocking evaluation and complaint. Parents don't want to have their kids coming home even better equipped to do what many are already too inclined to. And they certainly don’t want it applied to what they, as adults, esteem.

Secondly, critical thinking is conceived of, by many people, as little more than a weapon. Parents only want weapons pointed at the things and people they disapprove of. Many would sooner trust their kids with firearms. You can’t destroy Faith with a bullet; but you can sure weaken it with critical reflection. So it is that critical thinking is shunned if it focusses back on one’s families’ own beliefs and values.

The third reason why it is not taught is that it is not sufficiently emphasized that, in order to avoid indoctrination, all reasoning in critical thinking classes, is hypothetical. It examines what connections among thoughts might exist. It need not take the additional step of advocating action. People outside of schools tend to be, or pretend to be, action oriented. To think something is to act on it. Teachers -- indeed instructors at all levels of education -- often overstep the boundary here and try to surreptitiously press students to act, rather than let those students reflect on whether they have good, personal grounds for action.

But messages here are mixed. Parents, and social leaders, want teachers to get their students to act in ways those higher-ups approve of. The incessant worry about values education reflects this. But teachers who get kids to act, no matter how morally and rationally, in ways their superiors find discomforting, are liable to criticism, even dismissal.

The forth and final reason is that critical thinking instruction is seldom thought of by non-educators as teaching how to "get down to facts" or "uncover basic values.” (See Authority, Fact & Value). Assuring that indoctrination will be avoided, critical thinking skills could be seen as even more important when applied to things we value. For example, most people when they want to sell their house, overprice it and try to show it to prospective buyers full of the memorabilia that makes it a home for them, the present owners. They don’t see the faults and don’t consider that piles of books, souvenirs and pillows they personally find comforting and homey, are likely to be just junk in the eyes of a prospective buyer.

Suppose you, the seller, were buying a house. What would you be concerned about? The age of the roof? A wet basement? Termite or mold damage? Make a list of questions. Now ask yourself what the answers might be for this beloved domicile, this home you are putting up for … sacrifice, er… sale? Don’t make excuses or cover-ups. An astute buyer wouldn’t. Use critical thinking methods to guide your actions. If you won’t, a good real estate agent will.

The practice of systemizing and standardizing questioning has long been followed in many occupations, especially, the law. Sets of broad, standardized questions are called “Interrogatories.” Many kinds of legal activity, for example, require that interrogatories be completed, before time is spent by specialists in judicial proceedings.

Here is a hypothetical example for educators: suppose we were considering whether to incorporate computer literacy into a class on printmaking. Important questions in developing an interrogatory might be:
1. Is there a consensus among specialists in both printmaking (and computer literacy) as to what pertinent knowledge computer literacy offers?
2. Do the students already have that knowledge?
3. If they already "know" computer literacy, in some sense, is it in a form they can use?
4. Will computer literacy enhance their skills as practitioners in printmaking ?
5. Will computer literacy enhance their performance in those many activities that support printmaking as an enterprise, e.g. academically or vocationally?
Notice that merely to answer these questions does not automatically commit you to the change, or even, to resisting the change.
(For more on this see Evaluating Proposed Program Expansion)


A useful, non-formal approach to critical thinking is to get familiar with formulating and using interrogatories. For example of interrogatories and their applications, see Developing Interrogatories to Aid Analysis, 
Problem-Solving and Conflict Resolution


Cordially
--- EGR